apprehensions on his part, but he declared again:

The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the
concern of his Majesty's Government....

I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an
exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their
views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the
situation.--(British "White Paper" No. 5.)

We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to
hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct,
would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with
great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the
conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon,
in London:

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four
powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join
in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St.
Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some
action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into
Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian
demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take
action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and, therefore, once the
Austrians had attacked Servia it would be too late for any
mediation.--(British "White Paper" No. 10.)

Thus, England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows
Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have