proceeded against Servia by that time Russia must make war, and the
conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered
unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the
fatalistic view that it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a
conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky:

I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had
expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to
exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said
that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the
Austrian note, the shortness of time allowed, and the wide scope of
the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was
concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence
alone.--(British "White Paper" No. 11.)

From a conversation of Grey with the Prince Lichnowsky, the German
Ambassador, on July 25:

Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling
[this refers to the visit at St. Petersburg by Messrs. Poincaré and
Viviani] at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and
could not, therefore, be sure of their views.--(British "White
Paper" No. 25.)

If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must
have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about
the stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia,
whereas he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was
bound to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded
from Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria.