trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in
the event of its taking place.--(British "White Paper" No. 55.)

Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by
keeping in touch with Grey, who of course would have been the Chairman.
The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have
enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy.
Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg:

... and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance
which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to
give in respect to Servia's integrity and independence.... In reply
his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not
be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these
two points....--(British "White Paper" No. 72.)

Entirely in contrast herewith is one report of the British
representative in Vienna, dated Aug. 1, and speaking of a conversation
with the Russian Ambassador there:

Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied
even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and
independence. He said that Russia had no intention to attack
Austria.--(British "White Paper" No. 141.)

What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had
formed concerning Russia's real intentions? He learns from Russian
sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees
for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such
guarantees. It is the same duplicity which Russia, when its own