the reasons given to afford me any support on the most critical day of
all, viz., the 26th.

At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of
his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second
Corps and the Fourth Division.

At this time the guns of four German army corps were in position against
them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it
impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face
of such an attack.

I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavors to break off the action
and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me
to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable
of movement.

The French cavalry corps, under Gen. Sordêt, was coming up on our left
rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his
utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing
to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any
way.

There had been no time to intrench the position properly, but the troops
showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.

The artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a
splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

[Illustration: Map 1.--Showing the early stages of the retreat from