It is important to notice that there is no question here of a logical
right. We are concerned with matters regarding which, according to
Professor James, we cannot look for intellectual evidence. It is
assumed that we believe simply because we choose to believe--we believe
arbitrarily.

It is further important to notice that what is a "live" hypothesis to
one man need not tempt the will of another man at all. As our author
points out, a Turk would naturally will to believe one thing and a
Christian would will to believe another. Each would will to believe
what struck him as a satisfactory thing to believe.

What shall we say to this doctrine? I think we must say that it is
clearly not a philosophical _method of attaining to truth_. Hence, it
has not properly a place in this chapter among the attempts which have
been made to attain to the truth of things.

It is, in fact, not concerned with truths, but with assumptions, and
with assumptions which are supposed to be made on the basis of no
evidence. It is concerned with "seemings."

The distinction is a very important one. Our Turk cannot, by willing
to believe it, make his hypothesis true; but he can make it _seem_
true. Why should he wish to make it seem true whether it is true or
not? Why should he strive to attain to a feeling of subjective
certainty, not by logically resolving his doubts, but by ignoring them?

The answer is given us by our author. He who lives in the midst of
doubts, and refuses to cut his knot with the sword of belief, misses