doctrine which has already made its appearance in many forms and has
been discussed at prodigious length in the centuries gone by.

In certain sciences it seems possible to ignore the past, to a great
extent, at least. What is worth keeping has been kept, and there is a
solid foundation on which to build for the future. But with reflective
thought it is not so. There is no accepted body of doctrine which we
have the right to regard as unassailable. We should take it as a safe
maxim that the reflections of men long dead _may_ be profounder and
more worthy of our study than those urged upon our attention by the men
of our day.

And this leads me to make a remark upon the titles given to works on
metaphysics. It seems somewhat misleading to label them: "Outlines of
Metaphysics" or "Elements of Metaphysics." Such titles suggest that we
are dealing with a body of doctrine which has met with general
acceptance, and may be compared with that found in handbooks on the
special sciences. But we should realize that, when we are concerned
with the profounder investigations into the nature of our experience,
we tread upon uncertain ground and many differences of opinion obtain.
We should, if possible, avoid a false semblance of authority.

75. EPISTEMOLOGY.--We hear a great deal at the present day of
Epistemology, or the Theory of Knowledge. I have not classed it as a
distinct philosophical science, for reasons which will appear below.

We have seen in Chapter XVI that it is possible to treat of logic in a
simple way without growing very metaphysical; but we have also seen
that when we go deeply into questions touching the nature of evidence
and what is meant by truth and falsity, we are carried back to