But it is not so in philosophy. It is not possible to regard the
philosophical reflections of Plato and of Aristotle as superseded in
the same sense in which we may so regard their science. The reason for
this lies in the difference between scientific thought and reflective
thought.

The two have been contrasted in Chapter II of this volume. It was
there pointed out that the sort of thinking demanded in the special
sciences is not so very different from that with which we are all
familiar in common life. Science is more accurate and systematic, it
has a broader outlook, and it is free from the imperfections which
vitiate the uncritical and fragmentary knowledge which experience of
the world yields the unscientific. But, after all, the world is much
the same sort of a world to the man of science and to his uncritical
neighbor. The latter can, as we have seen, understand what, in
general, the former is doing, and can appropriate many of his results.

On the other hand, it often happens that the man who has not, with
pains and labor, learned to reflect, cannot even see that the
philosopher has a genuine problem before him. Thus, the plain man
accepts the fact that he has a mind and that it knows the world. That
both mental phenomena and physical phenomena should be carefully
observed and classified he may be ready to admit. But that the very
conceptions of mind and of what it means to know a world are vague and
indefinite in the extreme, and stand in need of careful analysis, he
does not realize.

In other words, he sees that our knowledge needs to be extended and
rendered more accurate and reliable, but he does not see that, if we
are to think clearly and consciously, all our knowledge needs to be