for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do
differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one
another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a
sum?

EUTHYPHRO: True.

SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly
end the differences by measuring?

EUTHYPHRO: Very true.

SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a
weighing machine?

EUTHYPHRO: To be sure.

SOCRATES: But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and
which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I
dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I
will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are
the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are not
these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable
satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel,
when we do quarrel? (Compare Alcib.)

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we
quarrel is such as you describe.

SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur,