who has communicated his art to his descendants.

Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of
Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner: 'Is all the pious just?'
'Yes.' 'Is all the just pious?' 'No.' 'Then what part of justice is
piety?' Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which
'attends' to the gods, as there is another part of justice which 'attends'
to men. But what is the meaning of 'attending' to the gods? The word
'attending,' when applied to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some
way they are made better. But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any
better? Euthyphro explains that he means by pious acts, acts of service or
ministration. Yes; but the ministrations of the husbandman, the physician,
and the builder have an end. To what end do we serve the gods, and what do
we help them to accomplish? Euthyphro replies, that all these difficult
questions cannot be resolved in a short time; and he would rather say
simply that piety is knowing how to please the gods in word and deed, by
prayers and sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates, piety is 'a science
of asking and giving'--asking what we want and giving what they want; in
short, a mode of doing business between gods and men. But although they
are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return? 'Nay,
but we give them honour.' Then we give them not what is beneficial, but
what is pleasing or dear to them; and this is the point which has been
already disproved.

Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro,
remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of piety,
or he would never have prosecuted his old father. He is still hoping that
he will condescend to instruct him. But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot
stay. And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature of piety before he is
prosecuted for impiety has disappeared. As in the Euthydemus the irony is