corresponding respectively to the adjective (philon) and the participle
(philoumenon), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb
(philoumenon and phileitai). The act is prior to the state (as in
Aristotle the energeia precedes the dunamis); and the state of being loved
is preceded by the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is preceded
by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore
piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such subtleties
of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region of thought
and feeling. He means to say that the words 'loved of the gods' express an
attribute only, and not the essence of piety.

Then follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of justice.'
Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation.
He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the
great poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated,
and which is the universal want of all men. To this the soothsayer adds
the ceremonial element, 'attending upon the gods.' When further
interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of this 'attention to the gods,'
he replies, that piety is an affair of business, a science of giving and
asking, and the like. Socrates points out the anthropomorphism of these
notions, (compare Symp.; Republic; Politicus.) But when we expect him to
go on and show that the true service of the gods is the service of the
spirit and the co-operation with them in all things true and good, he stops
short; this was a lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to
understand, and which every one must learn for himself.

There seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little
Dialogue: (1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety; (2) the
antithesis of true and false religion, which is carried to a certain extent
only; (3) the defence of Socrates.