days following the one which from its associations has come to be known
among soldiers as "Mournful Monday." Standing on the naval battery, one
could watch Boers hard at work preparing positions near Lombard's Kop,
and along the crest of Bulwaan, for artillery that was probably then
being brought by railway from Laing's Nek, and at the same time columns
of Boer horsemen were moving behind Bulwaan southwards, evidently intent
upon cutting our own lines of communication. That they would be allowed
to accomplish it without a timely effort on our part to prevent them
seemed inconceivable.

For most of us it was a shock to realise that ten or twelve thousand
British soldiers could be shut up by an army of Boer farmers before any
attempt at a counter-stroke had been made. The mobility of our enemies,
however, gives them a wonderful advantage in such movements over a force
that consists mainly of slow-moving infantry, and unless opportunity is
taken to attack them promptly, when they may be beaten in detail, their
power for mischief is very far-reaching. Possibly Sir George White was
quite right to put his trust in defensive tactics, knowing that he could
hold Ladysmith against all attempts of the Boers to capture it
notwithstanding their numerical superiority, but it is none the less
vexatious and unpleasant to find ourselves beleaguered and bombarded.

Whether the enemy had power to invest Ladysmith effectually, and keep a
strong force across our lines of communication would only be ascertained
by a reconnaissance. Directly and without any warning except to officers
commanding detachments, a force assembled at the earliest hour this
morning (Nov. 2). There was so little fuss that soldiers lying in tents
on bivouac slept undisturbed by the clanking of bits as horses were
saddled, or the rumble of wheels when a battery moved to their places in
the column. Artillery, 5th Lancers, 18th Hussars, Natal Carbineers,