readiness, should I find it necessary to call upon them for active
service.

Sir T. Shepstone also wrote, concerning the reality of the danger,
under date December 25:

The Boers are still flying, and I think by this time there must be a
belt of more than a hundred miles long and thirty broad, in which,
with three insignificant exceptions, there is nothing but absolute
desolation. This will give your Excellency some idea of the mischief
which Cetewayo's conduct has caused.

And again (April 30, 1878):

I find that Secocoeni acts as a kind of lieutenant to Cetewayo. He
received directions from the Zulu King, and these directions are by
Secocoeni issued to the various Basuto tribes in the Transvaal.

Sir T. Shepstone rushed the annexation. He plucked the fruit that
would have fallen. He himself has said that he might have waited
until the Zulus actually made their threatened murderous raid. That
might have been Macchiavelian statecraft, but it would not have been
humanity; and there was nothing in the attitude of the Boer leaders
at the time of the annexation which foreshadowed the fierce and
determined opposition which afterwards developed. The fact seems to
be that the people of the Transvaal were either in favour of the
annexation, or were overpowered and dazed by the hopelessness of the
Republic's outlook; and they passively assented to the action of Sir
Theophilus Shepstone and his twenty-five policemen. The Boers were
quite unable to pay the taxes necessary to self-government and the