clear manner. And not only is it that the existence of such a standard
has not been clearly conceived; but the need for it seems to have been
scarcely even felt. Men read books on this topic, and attend lectures on
that; decide that their children shall be instructed in these branches
of knowledge, and shall not be instructed in those; and all under the
guidance of mere custom, or liking, or prejudice; without ever
considering the enormous importance of determining in some rational way
what things are really most worth learning. It is true that in all
circles we hear occasional remarks on the importance of this or the
other order of information. But whether the degree of its importance
justifies the expenditure of the time needed to acquire it; and whether
there are not things of more importance to which such time might be
better devoted; are queries which, if raised at all, are disposed of
quite summarily, according to personal predilections. It is true also,
that now and then, we hear revived the standing controversy respecting
the comparative merits of classics and mathematics. This controversy,
however, is carried on in an empirical manner, with no reference to an
ascertained criterion; and the question at issue is insignificant when
compared with the general question of which it is part. To suppose that
deciding whether a mathematical or a classical education is the best is
deciding what is the proper _curriculum_, is much the same thing as to
suppose that the whole of dietetics lies in ascertaining whether or not
bread is more nutritive than potatoes!

The question which we contend is of such transcendent moment, is, not
whether such or such knowledge is of worth but what is its _relative_
worth? When they have named certain advantages which a given course of
study has secured them, persons are apt to assume that they have
justified themselves; quite forgetting that the adequateness of the
advantages is the point to be judged. There is, perhaps, not a subject