suspended.

[Sidenote: Cadorna believes the enemy will use large reserves.]

According to the talk one heard in Italy, Cadorna had already had in
mind the chance of a strong autumn attack on his army when he arrested
his own offensive in September after capturing by a brilliant stroke the
greater part of the Bainsizza plateau beyond the Isonzo, taking thirty
thousand prisoners and one hundred and fifty guns. The French and
British general staffs, it was said, had asked Cadorna whether he meant
to go on with his offensive, for which they had contributed contingents
of guns. Cadorna's reply had been that he had strong Austrian forces
against him, of which he knew the total, but that he also believed large
reserves of unknown quantity were available for use against him, owing
to the collapse of the Russian Army. In these circumstances he preferred
to consolidate and prepare rather than to continue to challenge forces
that could not be exactly estimated.

Both the increase of enemy strength on the Italian front and the
paralyzing uncertainty under which the Allies labored, were directly due
to the debacle of the Russian Army during the summer. The means by which
commanders-in-chief arrive at the indispensable knowledge of what forces
they have against them is through a highly organized intelligence
department, working in close cooperation with the similar departments of
the other Allied armies.

[Sidenote: How the enemy's strength is ascertained.]

Each of these departments, by interrogating prisoners and reading papers
found on enemy dead, by collating the reports of the air service, by