ingratiate himself once more into the favour of the Dutch he failed to
realise that while there are cases when animosity can give way before
political necessity, it is quite impossible in private to shake hands with
an individual whom one despises. And that such persons as Mrs. van Koopman
or Mr. Schreiner, for instance, despised Rhodes there can be no doubt.

They were wrong in doing so. Rhodes was essentially a man of moods, and
also an opportunist in his strange, blunt way. Had the Dutch rallied round
him during the last war it is certain that he would have given himself up
body and soul to the task of trying to smooth over the difficulties which
gave such an obstinate character to the war. He would have induced the
English Government to grant to all rebel colonists who returned to their
allegiance a generous pardon and reinstatement into their former rights.

Even while the war lasted it is a fact that, in a certain sense, Rhodes'
own party suspected him of betraying its interests. I feel almost sure
that Sir Alfred Milner did not trust him, but, nevertheless, he would have
liked Rhodes as a coadjutor. If the two men were never on sincerely
cordial terms with one another it was not the fault of the High
Commissioner, who, with that honesty of which he always and upon every
occasion gave proof, tried to secure the co-operation of the great South
African statesman in his difficult task. But Rhodes would not help Sir
Alfred. But neither, too, would he help the Dutch unless they were willing
to eat humble pie before him. In fact, it was this for which Rhodes had
been waiting ever since the Raid. He wanted people to ask his forgiveness
for the faults he himself had committed. He would have liked Sir Alfred
Milner to beg of him as a favour to take the direction of public affairs,
and he would have desired the whole of the Dutch party to come down _in
corpore_ to Groote Schuur, to implore him to become their leader and to
fight not only for them but also for the rights of President Kruger, whom