more concerned with "atmosphere" than with truth. The modern
investigator finds no evidence for it and every evidence against
it. Webster was both too proud and too familiar with the
political situation, North and South, to make such a monstrous
mistake. The printed or manuscript letters to or from Webster in
1850 and 1851 show him and his friends deeply concerned over the
danger to the Union, but not about the presidency. There is
rarest mention of the matter in letters by personal or political
friends; none by Webster, so far as the writer has observed.

[71] Writings and Speeches, X. 57; "Notes for the Speech,"
281-291; Winthrop MSS., Apr. 3.


If one comes to the speech familiar with both the situation in
1850 as now known, and with Webster's earlier and later speeches
and private letters, one finds his position and arguments on the
7th of March in harmony with his attitude toward Union and
slavery, and with the law and the facts. Frankly reiterating both
his earlier view of slavery "as a great moral, political and
social evil" and his lifelong devotion to the Union and its
constitutional obligations, Webster took national, practical,
courageous grounds. On the fugitive slave bill and the Wilmot
Proviso, where cautious Whigs like Winthrop and Everett were
inclined to keep quiet in view of Northern popular feeling,
Webster "took a large view of things" and resolved, as Foote saw,
to risk his reputation in advocating the*only practicable
solution. Not only was Webster thoroughly familiar with the
facts, but he was pre-eminently logical and, as Calhoun had
admitted, once convinced, "he cannot look truth in the face and