we shall explain by and by.

In the next place I will endeavour to explain the doctrine--not to
prove it, but to show its rationality, and to explain what it is.

The first illustration we endeavour to give in this is taken from the
world of matter. We will take any material substance: we find in that
substance qualities; we will say three qualities--colour, shape, and
size. Colour is not shape, shape is not size, size is not colour. They
are three distinct essences, three distinct qualities, and yet they
all form one unity, one single conception, one idea--the idea for
example, of a tree.

Now we will ascend from that into the immaterial world; and here to be
something more distinct still. Hitherto we have had but three
qualities; we now come to the mind of man, where we find something
more than qualities. We will take three--the will, the affections, and
the thoughts of man. His will is not his affections, neither are his
affections his thoughts; and it would be imperfect and incomplete to
say that these are mere qualities in the man. They are separate
consciousnesses, living consciousnesses--as distinct, and as really
sundered as it is possible for three things to be, yet bound together
by one unity of consciousness. Now we have distincter proof than even
this that these things are three. The anatomist can tell you that the
localities of these powers are different. He can point out the seat of
the nerve of sensation; he can localize the feeling of affection; he
can point to a nerve and say, "There resides the locality of thought."

There are three distinct localities for three distinct qualities,
personalities, consciousnesses; yet all these three are one.