At first sight it would seem that De Chaves in this argument takes no
account of superiority of seamanship--the factor which was destined to
turn the scale against Spain upon the sea. But the following passage
with which he concludes shows that he regarded seamanship as the
controlling factor in every case. 'And if,' he argues, 'they say that
the enemy will take the same thought and care as I, I answer that when
both be equal in numbers and arms, then in such case he who shall be
more dexterous and have more spirit and fortitude he will conquer, the
which he will not do, although he have more and better arms and as
much spirit as he will, if he be wanting in good order and
counsel. Just as happens in fencing, that the weaker man if he be more
dexterous gives more and better hits than the other who does not
understand the beats nor knows them, although he be the stronger. And
the same holds good with any army whatsoever on land, and it has been
seen that the smaller by their good order have defeated the stronger.'

From the work in question Captain Fernandez Duro gives four sections
or chapters in Appendix 12 to the first volume of his history,[2]
namely, 1. 'Of war or battle at sea,' relating to single ship
actions. 2. 'The form of a battle and the method of fighting,'
relating to armament, fire discipline, boarding and the like. 3. 'Of a
battle of one fleet against another.' 4. 'Battle.' In the last two
sections is contained the earliest known attempt to formulate a
definite fighting formation and tactical system for sailing fleets,
and it is from these that the following extracts have been translated.

It will be noted that in the root-idea of coming as quickly as
possible to close quarters, and in relying mainly on end-on fire, the
proposed system is still quite mediæval and founded mainly upon
galley tactics. But a new and advanced note is struck in the author's