sufficient) into one only front, but that the ablest and most warlike
ships should be so stationed as that the agility of the smaller ships
and the strength of the other may be communicated[2] to a mutual
relief, and for the better serving in all occasions either of chase or
charge; to which end they order that all the files of the front that
are to the windwards should be made up of the strongest and best
ships, that so they may the surer and speedier relieve all such of the
weaker ships, being to leewards of them, as shall be endangered or
anyway oppressed by any of the enemy.' All this is a clear echo of De
Chaves and the system which still obtained in all continental
navies. For a large fleet at least Boteler evidently disapproved all
tactics based on the line abreast, and preferred a system of small
groups attacking in line ahead, on Cecil's proposed system. Asked
about the campaign of 1588, he has nothing to tell of any English
formation. Of the crescent order of the Armada he says--and modern
research has fully confirmed his statement--that it was not a battle
order at all, but only a defensive sailing formation 'to keep
themselves together and in company until they might get up to be
athwart Gravelines, which was the rendezvous for their meeting with
the Prince of Parma; and in this regard this their order was
commendable.'

How far these ideas really represented current naval opinion we cannot
precisely tell, but we know that Boteler was an officer held in high
enough esteem to receive the command of the landing flotilla at Cadiz,
and to be described as 'an able and experienced sea captain.' But
whatever tendency there may have been to tactical progress under
Buckingham's inspiring personality, it must have been smothered by the
lamentable conduct of his war. Later on in the reign, in the period of
the 'Ship-money' fleets, when Charles was endeavouring to establish a