attitude was shown by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while disclaiming that
Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany
approved its point of view,

"and that certainly the arrow, once sent, Germany could not
allow herself to be guided except by her duty to her ally."

This seemed to be the fatal fallacy of Germany, that its duties to
civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria,
whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it
carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual war
may be defensible, but to support it in times of peace in an iniquitous
demand and a policy of gross discourtesy offends every sense of
international morality.

On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter
into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in
common of some clauses of the Austrian note of July 23. _To this Austria
never even replied._ The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion
to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he
would "find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," but this
did not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador
in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in
reply to a similar suggestion that Germany should suggest to Vienna to
meet Servia in the same conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown, the
Ambassador answered that that "was not possible in view of the
resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict."

On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in