To which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for
fear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like
pressure it might "_cause them [Austria] to precipitate matter and
present a fait accompli_." [See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir
Edward Grey, July 29--English "White Paper," No. 70.]

This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while
Austria was making progress toward Belgrade. It assumes that Austria
might not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of
its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's
wish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German
Secretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic
pleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is
it ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary
of State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not
sure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war,
as though the declaration of war against Servia had not been planned and
expected from the first.

As a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Ambassador at Berlin
then suggested that after Austria had satisfied her military prestige,
the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to
discuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing
graver complications.

To this proposal the German Secretary of State seemingly acquiesced,
but, as usual, _nothing whatever was done_. [English "White Paper," No.
76.] It is true that on July 29 Sir Edward Grey was assured by the
German Ambassador that the German Foreign Office was