Again, quoting German "White Paper," Annex 1B, Germany desired "that
the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on
account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences
impossible to measure." The explanation of this statement is not--an
aggressor threatens his adversary, but, rather, a prudent man begs
opposing factions to keep cool.

Great space is devoted in the article in question to Germany's
unwillingness to place the Austro-Servian controversy in the hands of
France, England, Germany, and Italy. As Germany disavows all interest in
the controversy, if she speaks truly, it was not within her power to
dictate to her ally in a matter which she could in nowise control except
by force of arms. Furthermore, had she had the power, how could she be
expected to exert pressure on her ally to leave a vital controversy to a
court of four, two of whom were bound by alliances with Russia,
Austria's real antagonist, and a third, (Italy,) as subsequent events
have shown, Austria's natural, geographical, and hereditary enemy? At
best, had each power held to its treaty obligations, there would have
been a deadlock.

Further: "The Russian Minister ... called at the German Foreign Office
and asked it 'to urge upon Vienna ... to take up this line of
conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.'"
Elsewhere in the article a statement is made that the Austro-Servian and
Austro-Russian questions "for all practical purposes ... were
indistinguishable." This inconsistency of having Servia in the light of
a principal and then again in the light of an agent is the greatest
stumbling block to a clear analysis of the precipitating cause of the
war. The logical explanation of Servia's position is that of Russia's
agent. Hence Germany could not be expected to exert the same pressure on