methods of approach to a proud and ancient people. Mr.
Foster reminds us that in the negotiations which terminated in
the treaty of 1858,


``The British were pushing demands not insisted upon by the other
Powers, and they could only be obtained by coercive measures. The reports
in the Blue Books and the London newspapers show that Mr. Lay,
who personally conducted the negotiations for Lord Elgin, when he found
the Chinese commissioners obdurate, was accustomed to raise his voice,
charge them with having `violated their pledged word,' and threaten
them with Lord Elgin's displeasure and the march of the British troops to
Peking. And when this failed to bring them to terms, a strong detachment
of the British army was marched through Tien-tsin to strike terror
into its officials and inhabitants. Lord Elgin in his diary records the climax
of these demonstrations: `I have not written for some days, but they
have been busy ones. We went on fighting and bullying, and getting the
poor commissioners to concede one point after another, till Friday the
25th.' The next day the treaty was signed, and he closes the record as
follows: `Though I have been forced to act almost brutally, I am China's
friend in all this.' There can be no doubt that notwithstanding the seeming
paradox, Lord Elgin was thoroughly sincere in this declaration, and
that his entire conduct was influenced by a high sense of duty and by
what he regarded as the best interests of China.''[52]


[52] ``American Diplomacy in the Orient,'' pp. 241, 242.


But can we wonder that the Chinese were irritated and humiliated