years ago, the Algerines having broke their treaty with France, this
court sent Monsieur de Massiac, with one large and two small frigates:
he blockaded the harbor of Algiers three months, and they subscribed
to the terms he proposed. If it be admitted, however, that war, on the
fairest prospects, is still exposed to uncertainties, I weigh against
this the greater uncertainty of the duration of a peace bought with
money, from such a people, from a Dey eighty years old, and by a nation
who, on the hypothesis of buying peace, is to have no power on the sea
to enforce an observance of it.

So far I have gone on the supposition, that the whole weight of this war
would rest on us. But, 1. Naples will join us. The character of their
naval minister (Acton), his known sentiments with respect to the peace
Spain is officiously trying to make for them, and his dispositions
against the Algerines, give the best grounds to believe it. 2. Every
principle of reason assures,us, that Portugal will join us. I state this
as taking for granted, what all seem to believe, that they will not
be at peace with Algiers. I suppose, then, that a convention might be
formed between Portugal, Naples, and the United States, by which
the burthen of the war might be quotaed on them, according to their
respective wealth; and the term of it should be, when Algiers should
subscribe to a peace with all three on equal terms. This might be left
open for other nations to accede to, and many, if not most of the powers
of Europe (except France, England, Holland, and Spain, if her peace be
made), would sooner or later enter into the confederacy, for the sake of
having their peace with the piratical States guarantied by the whole.
I suppose, that, in this case, our proportion of force would not be the
half of what I first calculated on.

These are the reasons, which have influenced my judgment on this