depart. I think the extension was wise and proper on their part, because
the legislature having deemed rotation useful in the principal bank
constituted by them, there would be the same reason for it in the
subordinate banks to be established by the principal. It breaks in upon
the _esprit de corps_, so apt to prevail in permanent bodies; it gives
a chance for the public eye penetrating into the sanctuary of those
proceedings and practices, which the avarice of the directors may
introduce for their personal emolument, and which the resentments of
excluded directors, or the honesty of those duly admitted, might betray
to the public; and it gives an opportunity at the end of the year, or at
other periods, of correcting a choice, which, on trial, proves to have
been unfortunate; an evil of which themselves complain in their distant
institutions. Whether, however, they have a power to alter this or not,
the executive has no right to decide; and their consultation with you
has been merely an act of complaisance, or from a desire to shield so
important an innovation under the cover of executive sanction. But
ought we to volunteer our sanction in such a case? Ought we to disarm
ourselves of any fair right of animadversion, whenever that institution
shall be a legitimate subject of consideration? I own I think the most
proper answer would be, that we do not think ourselves authorized to
give an opinion on the question.

From a passage in the letter of the President, I observe an idea of
establishing a branch bank of the United States in New Orleans. This
institution is one of the most deadly hostility existing, against the
principles and form of our constitution. The nation is, at this time,
so strong and united in its sentiments, that it cannot be shaken at this
moment. But suppose a series of untoward events should occur, sufficient
to bring into doubt the competency of a republican government to meet
a crisis of great danger, or to unhinge the confidence of the people in