to decide for the executive, more than to the executive to decide for
them. Both magistracies are equally independent in the sphere of action
assigned to them. The judges, believing the law constitutional, had a
right to pass a sentence of fine and imprisonment, because the power was
placed in their hands by the constitution. But the executive, believing
the law to be unconstitutional, were bound to remit the execution of it;
because that power has been confided to them by the constitution. That
instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each
other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide
what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in
their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive also
in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch. Nor does
the opinion of the unconstitutionality, and consequent nullity of that
law, remove all restraint from the overwhelming torrent of slander,
which is confounding all vice and virtue, all truth and falsehood,
in the United States. The power to do that is fully possessed by the
several State legislatures. It was reserved to them, and was denied
to the General Government, by the constitution, according to our
construction of it. While we deny that Congress have a right to control
the freedom of the press, we have ever asserted the right of the States,
and their exclusive right, to do so. They have, accordingly, all of them
made provisions for punishing slander, which those who have time and
inclination resort to for the vindication of their characters. In
general, the State laws appear to have made the presses responsible for
slander as far as is consistent with its useful freedom. In those States
where they do not admit even the truth of allegations to protect the
printer, they have gone too far.

The candor manifested in your letter, and which I ever believed you to
possess, has alone inspired the desire of calling your attention once