consciousness, [p.21] and doubtless in important ways condition it,
but they are _not physical_ once man becomes _conscious_ of them. A union
of subject and object has now taken place, and consequently a new beginning
--a beginning which cannot be interpreted in terms of the things of
sense--starts on its course. This is Eucken's standpoint, and it is no
other than the carrying farther of some of the important results Kant
arrived at.

This difference between the natural and the mental sciences has been
emphasised, at various times, since the time of Plato. But the
difference tended to become obliterated through the discoveries of
natural science and its great influence during the latter half of the
nineteenth century. The key of evolution had come at last into the hands
of men, and it fitted so many closed doors; it provided an entrance to a
new kind of world, and gave new methods for knowing that world. But, as
already stated, evolution is capable of dealing with what _is_ in the
light of what _was_, and the _Is_ and the _Was_ are the physical
characteristics of things. In all this, mind and morals, as they are in
their own intrinsic nature operating in the world, are left out of
account. A striking example of this is found in the late Professor
Huxley's Romanes Lecture--_Evolution and Ethics_. In this remarkable
lecture it is shown that the cosmic order does not answer all our
questions, and is indifferent [p.22] and even antagonistic to our
ethical needs and ideals. Huxley's conclusion may be justly designated
as a failure of science to interpret the greatest things of life. Before
culture, civilisation, and morality become possible, a new point of
departure has to take place within human consciousness, and the attempt
to move in an ethical direction is as much hindered as helped by the
natural course of the physical universe. This lecture of Huxley's runs
parallel in many ways with Eucken's differentiation of Nature and