in a fitter state for belief of the fact from being already made aware
that it was probable. Let it not then be inferred, somewhat perversely,
that because antecedent probabilities are the staple of our present
argument, the theme itself, Religion, rests upon hypotheses so slender:
it rests not at all upon such straws as probabilities, but on posterior
evidence far more firm. What we now attempt is not to prop the ark, but
favourably to prëdispose the mind of any reckless Uzzah, who might
otherwise assail it; not to strengthen the weak places of religion, but
to annul such disinclination to receive Truth, as consists in prejudice
and misconception of its likelihood. The goodly ship is built upon the
stocks, the platforms are reared, and the cradle is ready; but mistaken
prëconceptions may scatter the incline with gravel-stones rather than
with grease, and thus put a needless hindrance to the launching: whereas
a clear idea that the probabilities are in favour, rather than the
reverse, will make all smooth, lubricate, and easy. If, then, we fail in
this attempt, no disservice whatever is done to Truth itself; no breach
is made in the walls, no mine sprung, no battlement dismantled; all the
evidences remain as they were; we have taken nothing away. Even granting
matters seemed anteriorily improbable, still, if evidence proved them
true, such anterior unlikelihood would entirely be merged in the stoutly
proven facts. Moreover, if we be adjudged to have succeeded, we have
added nothing to Truth itself; no, nor to its outworks. That sacred
temple stands complete, firm and glorious from corner-stone to
top-stone. We do but sweep away the rubbish at its base; the drifting
desert sands that choke its portals. We only serve that cause (a most
high privilege), by enlisting a prëjudgment in its favour. We propose
herein an auxiliary to evidence, not evidence itself; a finger-post to
point the way to faith; a little light of reason on its path. The risk
is really nothing; but the advantage, under favour, may be much.