intellect being a rasa tabula in these matters, I should think he is
in more favorable circumstances than they can be. But, seriously, let
me try, if possible, to fathom this curious dogma,--I beg your
pardon,--sentiment, I mean. Belief without faith in an intelligible
sense (if by this last we mean a condition of the emotions or
affections), I can understand; though if the truth believed be of a
nature to excite to emotion and to dictate action, and fail to do so,
I doubt whether men in general would not call that belief spurious. For
example, if a man, on being told that his house was on fire, sat still
in his neighbor's chimney-corner, and took no notice of the matter,
most persons would say that his assent was no true belief; for it did
not produce its effects, did not produce faith. But whether faith can
ever exist independently of belief,--whether it is not always involved
with it,--and whether there can be a faith worth a farthing that is
not based on a true belief,--that is the point on which I want light.
If I understand you, an acceptable faith may or may not coexist
with a true belief; and men who believe in Jupiter or Jehovah, in one
God or a thousand, who worship the sun, or an idol, or a cat, or a
monkey, all may have an equally acceptable faith."

"I affirm it."

"That as there may be belief in a truth without faith, so there may
be faith, though the intellect believes in a falsehood;--that faith,
in fact, is independent of knowledge, or of any particular condition
of the intellect?"

"I do not like the terms in which you express the sentiment, but I,
for one, believe it substantially correct."