terms be generally so understood, whether they be so used or not; men
would, in that case, suppose that faith, thus restricted, implies a
previous process of mind which is to be called exclusively belief. I
added, however, that I did not believe that the word faith was ever
thus understood in popular use; but that, on the contrary, it was
employed to imply belief founded on knowledge, or supposed knowledge,
and, where the belief was, in its very nature, practical, or involved
emotion, a conduct and a state of the affections corresponding thereto.
"But this," said I, "merely respects the Popular use of the words, and
if is hardly worth while to prolong discussion on it. As to the
reasoning which would show that belief does not properly exist at
all, because it may be all resolved into reason, founded on the
preponderance of evidence, where it does not matter whether that
preponderance be a ton or a scruple,--surely it is over-refined. Men
will always feel that there is a marked difference between the states
of mind in which they assent to a proposition of which they have no
more doubt than they have of their own existence, or to a proposition
in the mathematics, and to one in which they feel that only a few
grains turn the scale. To this conscious difference in the condition
of mind, they have given (and I suppose will not give) very different
names; and though they will continue to say that they believe that two
and two make four, but that they know it, they will say that they
believe that they will die before the end of the century, though they
will not say that they know that. The distinction between the certain
and the probable is felt to be far too important not to be marked by
corresponding varieties of speech; and speech has made them according."

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July 10. This morning Harrington fulfilled his promise of acquainting