find an answer to them; for, as Socrates and Parmenides both admit, the
denial of abstract ideas is the destruction of the mind. We can easily
imagine that among the Greek schools of philosophy in the fourth century
before Christ a panic might arise from the denial of universals, similar to
that which arose in the last century from Hume's denial of our ideas of
cause and effect. Men do not at first recognize that thought, like
digestion, will go on much the same, notwithstanding any theories which may
be entertained respecting the nature of the process. Parmenides attributes
the difficulties in which Socrates is involved to a want of
comprehensiveness in his mode of reasoning; he should consider every
question on the negative as well as the positive hypothesis, with reference
to the consequences which flow from the denial as well as from the
assertion of a given statement.

The argument which follows is the most singular in Plato. It appears to be
an imitation, or parody, of the Zenonian dialectic, just as the speeches in
the Phaedrus are an imitation of the style of Lysias, or as the derivations
in the Cratylus or the fallacies of the Euthydemus are a parody of some
contemporary Sophist. The interlocutor is not supposed, as in most of the
other Platonic dialogues, to take a living part in the argument; he is only
required to say 'Yes' and 'No' in the right places. A hint has been
already given that the paradoxes of Zeno admitted of a higher application.
This hint is the thread by which Plato connects the two parts of the
dialogue.

The paradoxes of Parmenides seem trivial to us, because the words to which
they relate have become trivial; their true nature as abstract terms is
perfectly understood by us, and we are inclined to regard the treatment of
them in Plato as a mere straw-splitting, or legerdemain of words. Yet
there was a power in them which fascinated the Neoplatonists for centuries