opinions of men; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer hold
of you, and you will not despise even the meanest things. But tell me, is
your meaning that things become like by partaking of likeness, great by
partaking of greatness, just and beautiful by partaking of justice and
beauty, and so of other ideas?' 'Yes, that is my meaning.' 'And do you
suppose the individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?' 'Why not
of the whole?' said Socrates. 'Because,' said Parmenides, 'in that case
the whole, which is one, will become many.' 'Nay,' said Socrates, 'the
whole may be like the day, which is one and in many places: in this way
the ideas may be one and also many.' 'In the same sort of way,' said
Parmenides, 'as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many--that is your
meaning?' 'Yes.' 'And would you say that each man is covered by the whole
sail, or by a part only?' 'By a part.' 'Then the ideas have parts, and
the objects partake of a part of them only?' 'That seems to follow.' 'And
would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible and yet remain
one?' 'Certainly not.' 'Would you venture to affirm that great objects
have a portion only of greatness transferred to them; or that small or
equal objects are small or equal because they are only portions of
smallness or equality?' 'Impossible.' 'But how can individuals
participate in ideas, except in the ways which I have mentioned?' 'That is
not an easy question to answer.' 'I should imagine the conception of ideas
to arise as follows: you see great objects pervaded by a common form or
idea of greatness, which you abstract.' 'That is quite true.' 'And
supposing you embrace in one view the idea of greatness thus gained and the
individuals which it comprises, a further idea of greatness arises, which
makes both great; and this may go on to infinity.' Socrates replies that
the ideas may be thoughts in the mind only; in this case, the consequence
would no longer follow. 'But must not the thought be of something which is
the same in all and is the idea? And if the world partakes in the ideas,
and the ideas are thoughts, must not all things think? Or can thought be