"Colony,"—or "Free State"? "Dependence,"—or "Just Connection"? - An Essay Based on the Political Philosophy of the American - Revolution, as Summarized in the Declaration of - Independence, towards the Ascertainment of the Nature of - the Political Relati by Alpheus H. Snow
page 20 of 86 (23%)
page 20 of 86 (23%)
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powers from the consent of the governed," is and was intended to be an
epitome of the two fundamental principles of the law of agency, brought over into the English law from the Roman. These principles are: "_Obligatio mandati consensu contrahentium consistit,"_ a translation of which is, "The powers of an agent are derived from the consent of the contracting parties," and "_Rei turpis nullum mandatum est_," a translation of which is "No agent can have unjust powers." If this interpretation be correct, the expression "that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed" means that there is no universal absolute right of communities, states, or nations, to institute their own governments, but that every government, however instituted, is universally the agent of the governed, to secure to every individual, every community, every state, and every nation governed, his and their unalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and to effectuate the equality of all men as the creatures of a common Creator. On this interpretation a rule is laid down to determine under what circumstances a community, state, or nation has the right to institute its own government. Its rights are to be determined by the principles of agency. Agencies among individuals are of several kinds, express and implied, voluntary and involuntary. There may be co-agencies, in which the performance of one general agency is distributed among several agents. A person of full capacity has the right, according to the common law of persons, to appoint his own agent, unless he is in such just relationship with others that the common interests require that he should adopt as his agent an agent appointed by the others. So communities, states and nations which are of full capacity, have the right, assuming the existence of this common law of nature and of |
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