extend not only to the states, but to all individuals throughout the
states.

Thus "dependence," as a fictitious and vicious form of connection, is,
it would appear, forever opposed to "connection" of a just and proper
kind. If it were attempted to sum up the issue of the American
Revolution in an epigram, would not that epigram be: "Colony,"--or
"Free State"? "Dependence,"--or "Just Connection"? "Empire,"--or
"Union"?

Summarizing, then, the result of this examination of the philosophy of
the Declaration, so far as it relates to communities rather than
persons, it appears that the central conception of this philosophy is
that of a universal right of free statehood. This conception, more
specifically, is, it seems, that all communities on the earth's
surface, within limits of territorial extent of such reasonable
dimensions that within the area of each the just common sentiment
about local concerns and external relations can be conveniently
ascertained and executed, have an unalienable right to be free states
and as such to have their respective just local sentiments about local
matters ascertained and executed by their respective governments, this
being, according to Revolutionary philosophy, essential to make
effective the right of each and every person to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. But a universal right of free statehood does not
imply a universal right of self-government. Statehood and
self-government are two different and distinct conceptions. The
Americans claimed the right of free statehood as a part of the
universal rights of man, but they claimed the right of self-government
because they were Englishmen trained by generations of experience in
the art of self-government and so capable of exercising the art. A