the harbor proper, two more hulks, and a small squadron consisting of
two ships-of-the-line and a frigate, masted, and in commission. This
division was not seriously engaged, and, as a factor in the battle,
may be disregarded.

The northern part of this defence was decisively the stronger. To
attack there, Nelson called "taking the bull by the horns." The
southern wing was much more exposed. Nor was this all. An advance from
the north must be made with a northerly wind. If unsuccessful, or
even, in case of success, if ships were badly crippled, they could not
return to the north, where the fleet was. On the other hand, attack
from the south presupposed a southerly wind, with which, after an
action, the engaged ships could rejoin the fleet, if they threaded
safely the difficult navigation. In any event there was risk, but none
knew better than Nelson that without risks war is not made. To the
considerations above given he added that, when south of the city, the
British would be interposed between the other Baltic navies and
Denmark. The latter, in that case, could not receive reinforcements,
unless the English squadron were first defeated. He therefore proposed
that ten ships-of-the-line, of the lighter draughts, which he offered
himself to lead, should pass through the outer, or northern channel,
gain the southern flank of the defence, and thence make the principal
attack, while the rest of the fleet supported them by a demonstration
against the northern end. The sagacity of this scheme is best attested
from the enemy himself. "We have been deceived in the plan of attack,"
wrote the historian Niebuhr, then residing in the city; "and," now
that the right wing of the defence is destroyed, "all is at stake."
The nights of the 30th and 31st were employed in surveying the waters,
laying down buoys to replace those removed by the Danes, and in
further reconnoissance of the enemy's position. The artillery officers