was anything in his mode of life, in current rumor, or in his past
relations with his new commander-in-chief, which might make the latter
unwilling to give him the loose rein St. Vincent had done.

From the time that Keith left the Mediterranean in July, 1799, to
Nelson's own departure a year later, there was little to be done in
the naval way except to maintain and press existing advantages, and
wait until the fruit was ready to drop. The absolute supremacy of the
British squadrons, challenged for a moment by the incursion of Admiral
Bruix, had reverted, in even greater degree than before, by the
absence of the Spanish ships which had accompanied him to Brest.
Impeded by their own numbers, and paralyzed by the insufficiency of
the resources of the port, they remained there a huge, inert mass,
whose impotence was only partially understood by the British; a fact
which conduced to prolong Keith's presence in the Channel. The year
under consideration was therefore devoid of stirring events at sea.

In the Mediterranean, it is true, Nelson's unwearying mental energy,
and keen sense of the necessity of seizing opportunity, did not allow
things to lapse into indolence. Whether or not he was well advised to
settle himself at Palermo, aware as he must have been of the actual
temptation, and of the serious injury that scandal was doing to his
reputation, both professional and personal, may admit of doubt. With
numerous detached and minor services carrying on at the same moment,
there was much to be said for the commander-in-chief remaining in a
fixed position, near the centre of affairs; and in his apprehension
everything then revolved about the Kingdom of Naples. There can be no
question, however, that all his faculties were constantly on the
alert; and that his administration of the station until Keith's return
was characterized by the same zeal, sagacity, and politic tact that he