possible for you to give any passport for a single Frenchman, much
less the Army, after my positive order of March 18th, 1799." The words
show what reports had already got about of the general trend of
policy, on the part of the Porte and the British representatives; but
the irony of the matter as regards Nelson is, that Smith disobeyed his
orders, as he himself, six months before, had disobeyed Keith's; and
for the same reason, that he on the spot was a better judge of local
conditions and recent developments than one at a distance. To one,
Naples was more important than Minorca, more important than a
half-dozen ships in a possible fleet action; to the other, Egypt was
more important than the presence of sixteen thousand veterans, more or
less, on a European battle-field. It is impossible and bootless, to
weigh the comparative degree of culpability involved in breaches of
orders which cannot be justified. It is perhaps safe to say that while
a subordinate has necessarily a large amount of discretion in the
particular matter intrusted to him, the burden of proof rests wholly
upon him when he presumes to depart from orders affecting the general
field of war, which is the attribute of the commander-in-chief. What
in the former case may be simply an error of judgment, in the latter
becomes a military crime.

On the 16th of January, 1800, Nelson, who some days before had been
notified by Keith of his approach, and directed to place himself under
his command, left Palermo for Leghorn, arriving on the 20th. The
commander-in-chief was already there in the "Queen Charlotte." On the
25th they sailed together for Palermo, and after nine days' stay in
that port went on again for Malta, which they reached on the 15th of
February. No incident of particular interest occurred during these
three weeks, but Nelson's letters to the Hamiltons show that he was
chafing under any act in his superior which could be construed into a