"good," only they are sure that we cannot mean what we say. They used to
be fond of assuming that "good" meant pleasure; or, at any rate, that
pleasure was the sole good as an end: two very different propositions.
That "good" means "pleasure" and that pleasure is the sole good was the
opinion of the Hedonists, and is still the opinion of any Utilitarians
who may have lingered on into the twentieth century. They enjoy the
honour of being the only ethical fallacies worth the powder and shot of
a writer on art. I can imagine no more delicate or convincing piece of
logic than that by which Mr. G.E. Moore disposes of both. But it is none
of my business to do clumsily what Mr. Moore has done exquisitely. I
have no mind by attempting to reproduce his dialectic to incur the
merited ridicule of those familiar with the _Principia Ethica_ or to
spoil the pleasure of those who will be wise enough to run out this very
minute and order a masterpiece with which they happen to be
unacquainted. For my immediate purpose it is necessary only to borrow
one shaft from that well-stocked armoury.

To him who believes that pleasure is the sole good, I will put this
question: Does he, like John Stuart Mill, and everyone else I ever heard
of, speak of "higher and lower" or "better and worse" or "superior and
inferior" pleasures? And, if so, does he not perceive that he has given
away his case? For, when he says that one pleasure is "higher" or
"better" than another, he does not mean that it is greater in _quantity_
but superior in _quality_.

On page 7 of _Utilitarianism_, J.S. Mill says:--

"If one of the two (pleasures) is, by those who are competently
acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they
prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater