lower and narrower sense, and thus one coming like Vauvenargues to see
this lowness and narrowness, sought to invest ideas and terms that in
fact only involved modifications of these, with a significance of direct
antagonism. Magnanimity was contrasted inimically with prudence, and
instinct and nature were made to thrust from their throne reason and
reflection. Carried to its limit, this tendency developed the
speculative and social excesses of the great sentimental school. In
Vauvenargues it was only the moderate, just, and most seasonable protest
of a fine observer, against the supremacy among ideals of a narrow,
deliberative, and calculating spirit.

His exaltation of virtuous instinct over reason is in a curious way
parallel to Burke's memorable exaltation over reason of prejudice.
'Prejudice,' said Burke, 'previously engages the mind in a steady course
of wisdom and virtue, and does not leave the man hesitating in the
moment of decision, sceptical, puzzled, and unresolved. Prejudice
renders a man's virtue his habit, and not a series of unconnected acts;
through just prejudice his duty becomes a part of his nature.'[35] What
Burke designated as prejudice, Vauvenargues less philosophically styled
virtuous instinct; each meant precisely the same thing, though the
difference of phrase implied a different view of its origin and growth:
and the side opposite to each of them was the same--namely, a
sophisticated and over-refining intelligence, narrowed to the
consideration of particular circumstances as they presented themselves.

Translated into the modern equivalent, the heart, nature, instinct of
Vauvenargues all mean _character_. He insisted upon spontaneous impulse
as a condition of all greatest thought and action. Men think and work on
the highest level when they move without conscious and deliberate strain
after virtue: when, in other words, their habitual motives, aims,