from the former.

3. Consequently, if libertarians grant causality as appertaining to the
will, however much they may beat about the bush, they are surrendering
their position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the more
ultimate question as to the nature of natural causation. Now it can be
proved that this more ultimate question is [scientifically]
unanswerable. Therefore both sides may denominate natural causation
_x_--an unknown quantity.

4. Hence the whole controversy ought to be seen by both sides to resolve
itself into this--is or is not the will determined by _x_? And, if this
seems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny the
fact. At the same time there is clearly this real issue remaining--viz.
Is the will self-determining, or is it determined--i.e. _from without_?

5. If determined from without, is there any room for freedom, in the
sense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility? And I
think the answer to this must be an unconditional negative.

6. But, observe, it is not one and the same thing to ask, Is the will
entirely determined from without? and Is the will entirely determined by
natural causation (_x_)? For the unknown quantity _x_ may very well
include _x'_, if by _x'_ we understand all the unknown ingredients of
personality.

7. Hence, determinists gain no advantage over their adversaries by any
possible proof (at present impossible) that all acts of will are due to
natural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, and
that it is of such a nature as supports their conclusion. For aught we