demonstrable--it really seems as if reason ceases to be a judge of
evidence or guide to truth, and becomes a mere advocate of opinion
already formed on quite other grounds. Now these other grounds are, as
we have seen, mainly the accidents of habit or custom, wish being father
to the thought, &c.

Now this may be all deplorable enough in politics, and in all other
beliefs secular; but who shall say it is not exactly as it ought to be
in the matter of beliefs religious? For, unless we beg the question of a
future life in the negative, we must entertain at least the possibility
of our being in a state of probation in respect of an honest use not
only of our reason, but probably still more of those other ingredients
of human nature which go to determine our beliefs touching this most
important of all matters.

It is remarkable how even in politics it is the moral and spiritual
elements of character which lead to success in the long run, even more
than intellectual ability--supposing, of course, that the latter is not
below the somewhat high level of our Parliamentary assemblies.

As regards the part that is played by will in the determining of belief,
one can show how unconsciously large this is even in matters of secular
interest. Reason is very far indeed from being the sole guide of
judgement that it is usually taken to be--so far, indeed, that, save in
matters approaching down-right demonstration (where of course there is
no room for any other ingredient) it is usually hampered by custom,
prejudice, dislike, &c., to a degree that would astonish the most sober
philosopher could he lay bare to himself all the mental processes
whereby the complex act of assent or dissent is eventually
determined[55].