[11] p. 47.

[12] p. 50.

[13] p. 63.

[14] pp. 58 ff.

[15] With reference to the views and arguments of the _Candid
Examination_, it may be interesting to notice here in detail that George
Romanes (1) came to attach much more importance to the subjective
religious needs and intuitions of the human spirit (pp. 131 ff.); (2)
perceived that the subjective religious consciousness can be regarded
objectively as a broad human phenomenon (pp. 147 f.); (3) criticized his
earlier theory of causation and returned _towards_ the theory that all
causation is volitional (pp. 102, 118); (4) definitely repudiated the
materialistic account of the origin of mind (pp. 30, 31); (5) returned
to the use of the expression 'the argument from design,' and therefore
presumably abandoned his strong objection to it; (6) 'saw through'
Herbert Spencer's refutation of the wider teleology expressed by Baden
Powell, and felt the force of the teleology again (p. 72); (7)
recognized that the scientific objections to the doctrine of the freedom
of the will are not finally valid (p. 128).

[16] See _Mind and Motion and Monism_, pp. 36 ff.

[17] In some 'Notes' of the Summer of 1893 I find the statement, 'The
result (of philosophical inquiry) has been that in his millennial
contemplation and experience man has attained certainty with regard to
certain aspects of the world problem, no less secure than that which he