attributes of man. The distinguishing features of any theory which can
properly be termed a Religion, is that it should refer to the ultimate
source, or sources, of things: and that it should suppose this source to
be of an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. To apply the term
Religion to any other theory is merely to abuse it.

From these definitions, then, it appears that the aims and methods of
Science are exclusively concerned with the ascertaining and the proof of
the proximate How of things and processes physical: her problem is, as
Mill states it, to discover what are the fewest number of (phenomenal)
data which, being granted, will explain the phenomena of experience. On
the other hand, Religion is not in any way concerned with causation,
further than to assume that all things and all processes are ultimately
due to intelligent personality. Religion is thus, as Mr. Spencer says,
'an _à priori_ theory of the universe'--to which, however, we must add,
'and a theory which assumes intelligent personality as the originating
source of the universe.' Without this needful addition, a religion would
be in no way logically distinguished from a philosophy.

From these definitions, then, it clearly follows that in their purest
forms, Science and Religion really have no point of logical contact.
Only if Science could transcend the conditions of space and time, of
phenomenal relativity, and of all human limitations, only then could
Science be in a position to touch the supernatural theory of Religion.
But obviously, if Science could do this, she would cease to be Science.
In soaring above the region of phenomena and entering the tenuous aether
of noumena, her present wings, which we call her methods, would in such
an atmosphere be no longer of any service for movement. Out of time, out
of place, and out of phenomenal relation, Science could no longer exist
as such.