the argument is not really, or logically, strengthened by the mere
accumulation of any number of special cases of mechanism in nature, all
as mechanisms similar in kind. Let us now consider this argument.

If we are disposed to wonder why natural theologians prior to the days
of Darwin were content to assume that mind is the only possible cause of
mechanism, I think we have a ready answer in the universal prevalence of
their belief in special creation. For I think it is unquestionable that,
upon the basis of this belief, the assumption is legitimate. That is to
say, if we start with the belief that all species of plants and animals
were originally introduced to the complex conditions of their several
environments suddenly and ready made (in some such manner as watches are
turned out from a manufactory), then I think we are reasonably entitled
to assume that no conceivable cause, other than that of intelligent
purpose, could possibly be assigned in explanation of the effects. It
is, of course, needless to observe that in so far as this previous
belief in special creation was thus allowed to affect the argument from
design, that argument became an instance of circular reasoning. And it
is, perhaps, equally needless to observe that the mere fact of
evolution, as distinguished from special creation--or of the gradual
development of living mechanisms, as distinguished from their sudden
and ready-made apparition--would not in any way affect the argument from
design, unless it could be shown that the process of evolution admits
the possibility of some other cause which is not admitted by the
hypothesis of special creation. But this is precisely what is shown by
the theory of evolution as propounded by Darwin. That is to say, the
theory of the gradual development of living mechanisms propounded by
Darwin, is something more than a theory of gradual development as
distinguished from sudden creation. It is this, but it is also a theory
of a purely scientific kind which seeks to explain the purely physical