kind observed.

Thus, to take another instance of apparent design from inorganic nature,
it has been argued that the constitution of the atmosphere is clearly
designed for the support of vegetable and animal life. But before this
conclusion can be established upon the facts, it must be shown that life
could exist under no other material conditions than those which are
furnished to it by the elementary constituents of the atmosphere. This,
however, it is clearly impossible to show. For anything that we can know
to the contrary, life may actually be existing upon some of the other
heavenly bodies under totally different conditions as to atmosphere; and
the fact that on this planet all life has come to be dependent upon the
gases which occur in our atmosphere, may be due simply to the fact that
it was only the forms of life which were able to adapt themselves
(through natural selection or other physical causes) to these particular
gases which could possibly be expected to occur--just as in matters of
still smaller detail, it was only those forms of life that were suited
to their several habitats in the marine bay, which could possibly be
expected to be found in these several situations. Now, if a set of
adjustments so numerous and so delicate as those on which the relations
of every known form of life to the constituent gases of the atmosphere
are seen to depend, can thus be shown not necessarily to imply the
action of any disposing intelligence, how is it possible to conclude
that any less general exhibitions of adjustment imply this, so long as
every case of adjustment, whether or not ultimately due to design, is
regarded as proximately due to physical causes?

In view of these considerations, therefore, I think it is perfectly
clear that if the argument from teleology is to be saved at all, it can
only be so by shifting it from the narrow basis of special adaptations,