first cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument
that, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is
probably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch of
inference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced
worthless.

'§ 2. Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in
favour of Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds
are caused by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our
mind is caused by an unknown mind,--is a syllogism that is inadmissible
for two reasons. In the first place, it does not account for mind (in
the abstract) to refer it to a prior mind for its origin; and therefore,
although the hypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of
_known_ mind, it is useless as an argument for the existence of the
unknown mind, the assumption of which forms the basis of that
explanation. Again, in the next place, if it be said that mind is so far
an entity _sui generis_ that it must be either self-existing or caused
by another mind, there is no assignable warrant for the assertion. And
this is the second objection to the above syllogism; for anything within
the whole range of the possible may, for aught that we can tell, be
competent to produce a self-conscious intelligence. Thus an objector to
the above syllogism need not hold any theory of things at all; but even
as opposed to the definite theory of materialism, the above syllogism
has not so valid an argumentative basis to stand upon. We know that what
we call matter and force are to all appearance eternal, while we have no
corresponding evidence of a mind that is even apparently eternal.
Further, within experience mind is invariably associated with highly
differentiated collocations of matter and distributions of force, and
many facts go to prove, and none to negative, the conclusion that the
grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or at least is associated