nature or by man.

On any logical theory of Theism there can be no such distinction between
'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theory
all causation is but the action of the Divine Will. And if we draw any
distinction between such action as 'immediate' or 'mediate,' we can only
mean this as valid in relation to mankind--i.e. in relation to our
experience. For, obviously, it would be wholly incompatible with pure
agnosticism to suppose that we are capable of drawing any such
distinction in relation to the Divine activity itself. Even apart from
the theory of Theism, pure agnosticism must take it that the real
distinction is not between natural and supernatural, but between the
explicable and the inexplicable--meaning by those terms that which is
and that which is not accountable by such causes as fall within the
range of human observation. Or, in other words, the distinction is
really between the observable and the unobservable causal processes of
the universe.

Although science is essentially engaged in explaining, her work is
necessarily confined to the sphere of natural causation; beyond that
sphere (i.e. the sensuous) she can explain nothing. In other words,
even if she were able to explain the natural causation of everything,
she would be unable to assign the ultimate _raison d'être_ of anything.


It is not my intention to write an essay on the nature of causality, or
even to attempt a survey of the sundry theories which have been
propounded on this subject by philosophers. Indeed, to attempt this
would be little less than to write a history of philosophy itself.
Nevertheless it is necessary for my purpose to make a few remarks