which afforded little shelter were filled with men, and the enemy was
using his artillery freely. Machine guns in profusion were disgorging
their several streams of bullets. Communication trenches had been blotted
out. Despite the lessons of Neuve Chapelle there was no effective liaison
between artillery and infantry as the telephone wires were soon cut, and
as a consequence the inferno was intensified by the short firing of the
British artillery, a battery of 6-inch howitzers being the chief offender.

Numerous casualties had been suffered, and among them was the Commanding
Officer, who was killed. The command then passed to Major J.W.B. Hunt, who
decided that it was useless to attempt to assault the enemy position
without further artillery preparation, as the enemy's barbed wire was
practically intact, and the only two gaps that were available were covered
by enemy machine guns. A report on the situation was made to
Brigadier-General Thesiger, and instructions were received that on no
account was the Battalion to leave the front line, and it was to hold the
same against a possible and probable counter attack by the enemy.

At 10-0 a.m. the Battalion was ordered to prepare to take part in a second
attack to be launched at 11-15 a.m. Half an hour later a further order
postponed the second attack until 12-30 p.m. Thousands had failed to take
the objectives in the early morning, and it was unlikely that hundreds
would succeed in the afternoon. This attack was ultimately cancelled, and
at 4-0 p.m. the Battalion was withdrawn. A further attack was delivered in
vain at 4-30 p.m. by other regiments in the Division. Though the Battalion
unfortunately accomplished little, it sustained almost a hundred
casualties, but it was fortunate in that it escaped the same fate as
befell four of the Battalions in the Brigade which were almost
annihilated. The battle from almost every point of view was a dismal
failure, and the rate of casualties was perhaps the highest then recorded.