Wilson, and that he still had confidence in the President's
determination to uphold the national honour. Page was not one of those
who thought that the United States should declare war immediately after
the _Lusitania_. The President's course, in giving Germany a chance to
make amends, and to disavow the act, met with his approval, and he
found, also, much to admire in Mr. Wilson's first _Lusitania_ note. His
judgment in this matter was based first of all upon the merits of the
case; besides this, his admiration for Mr. Wilson as a public man was
strong. To think otherwise of the President would have been a great
grief to the Ambassador and to differ with his chief on the tremendous
issue of the war would have meant for Page the severance of one of the
most cherished associations of his life. The interest which he had shown
in advocating Wilson's presidential candidacy has already been set
forth; and many phases of the Wilson administration had aroused his
admiration. The President's handling of domestic problems Page regarded
as a masterpiece in reconciling statesmanship with practical politics,
and his energetic attitude on the Panama Tolls had introduced new
standards into American foreign relations. Page could not sympathize
with all the details of the Wilsonian Mexican policy, yet he saw in it a
high-minded purpose and a genuine humanitarianism. But the outbreak of
war presented new aspects of Mr. Wilson's mind. The President's attitude
toward the European struggle, his conception of "neutrality," and his
failure to grasp the meaning of the conflict, seemed to Page to show a
lack of fundamental statesmanship; still his faith in Wilson was
deep-seated, and he did not abandon hope that the President could be
brought to see things as they really were. Page even believed that he
might be instrumental in his conversion.

But in the summer and autumn of 1915 one agony followed another. The
"too proud to fight" speech was in Page's mind nothing less than a