used, implies these things: first, the gathering of knowledge
through observation; second, the classification of such
knowledge, and through this classification, the elaboration of
general ideas or principles. In the familiar definition of
Herbert Spencer, science is organized knowledge.

Now it is patent enough, at first glance, that the veriest savage
must have been an observer of the phenomena of nature. But it may
not be so obvious that he must also have been a classifier of his
observations--an organizer of knowledge. Yet the more we consider
the case, the more clear it will become that the two methods are
too closely linked together to be dissevered. To observe outside
phenomena is not more inherent in the nature of the mind than to
draw inferences from these phenomena. A deer passing through the
forest scents the ground and detects a certain odor. A sequence
of ideas is generated in the mind of the deer. Nothing in the
deer's experience can produce that odor but a wolf; therefore the
scientific inference is drawn that wolves have passed that way.
But it is a part of the deer's scientific knowledge, based on
previous experience, individual and racial; that wolves are
dangerous beasts, and so, combining direct observation in the
present with the application of a general principle based on past
experience, the deer reaches the very logical conclusion that it
may wisely turn about and run in another direction. All this
implies, essentially, a comprehension and use of scientific
principles; and, strange as it seems to speak of a deer as
possessing scientific knowledge, yet there is really no absurdity
in the statement. The deer does possess scientific knowledge;
knowledge differing in degree only, not in kind, from the
knowledge of a Newton. Nor is the animal, within the range of its